The First Strike: Message Dissemination

Background: In the course of the Gotham Shield (GS) functional exercise, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's (CDC) Joint Information Center (JIC) personnel became acutely aware of both the critical importance of timely messaging and the numerous communication barriers they would face following an IND detonation. They examined these barriers and worked with both the National Center for Environmental Health (NCEH) and several communication infrastructure experts to determine strategies to effectively disseminate information if common channels such as the Internet and email are not available.

Program background: CDC's JIC is managed by the Emergency Risk Communication Branch (ERCB), part of the Division of Emergency Operations. The JIC is staffed by personnel from both ERCB and communication experts from throughout CDC. Following an IND detonation, NCEH would join the JIC and work collaboratively to coordinate CDC's communication activities. The JIC's Outreach Team focuses on several aspects of message dissemination. ERCB personnel who work in JIC Outreach participated in planning for GS, the first drill that simulated activation immediately following detonation, and interim evaluation discussions.  

Evaluation Methods and Results: ERCB's Research and Evaluation Team is directly observing the activities of the GS functional exercise. They will also conduct formal discussions with participants to capture information regarding lessons learned. As of April 3, the GS series of exercises was still underway. After the initial GS activities, exercise participants engaged in formal discussions and made preliminary observations. These preliminary observations are reported here. Final results will be reported after GS concludes. Exercise participants found that advance planning is key for responding to an IND detonation. This includes planning for dysfunctional infrastructure. Past events such as the attacks on September 11, 2001, proved that local communication infrastructures can quickly become overloaded. An IND detonation would be an unprecedented event that would cause members of the public to simultaneously seek as much information as possible, leading to possible Internet overload. If cell towers are overloaded and the local Internet is off-line or is slowed down to unusable speeds, disseminating messages to affected members of the public could be very challenging. Exercise participants identified several possible solutions to communication barriers, all of which require advance planning to maximize the probability of success.

• Having information ready and accessible in advance
• Identifying and knowing partners/stakeholders in advance of an event
• Working with local radio stations
• Text messaging
• Use of priority-access cards for landline voice conversations and landline faxing
• Assigning priority access to some cell numbers
• Using satellite radio communication
• Faxing information to facilities that can print and directly distribute multiple copies

 

Conclusions: Final conclusions will be available following completion of the GS functional exercise in late April 2017. These conclusions will include suggestions for building IND response communication capacity for public health responders.  

Implications for research and/or practice: This presentation will help participants plan ahead for effective message dissemination following a radiological or nuclear event, or similar catastrophic event. This includes understanding potential communication barriers that may arise and potential solutions.